New Delhi, India – Recent findings by a fact-finding team composed of regional politicians aligned with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration reveal that China has reportedly denied the Indian army access to crucial patrolling points and encroached upon land within the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh. This revelation has ignited considerable political uproar in New Delhi, with opposition parties criticizing Modi’s perceived silence on alleged Chinese encroachments across various border fronts in recent years.
The newly surfaced information specifically pertains to Upper Subansiri, a remote and challenging mountainous district situated in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. This report threatens to destabilize a period of tentative improvement in relations between India and China, two historical adversaries who engaged in a war in 1962. The timing is particularly sensitive, occurring amidst US President Donald Trump’s trade wars, which have impacted both New Delhi and Beijing. Furthermore, these details emerge just weeks before Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to visit India to attend the BRICS summit, which New Delhi is slated to host from September 12-13.
India shares a vast 3,488-km border with China, stretching along India’s northern and eastern frontiers, encompassing regions such as Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh. A significant portion of this extensive border remains disputed, with India and China unable to even concur on the precise demarcation line – the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC) – that is ostensibly meant to distinguish the territories controlled by each nation. To fully understand the ongoing complexities, it is essential to delve into the specifics of these alleged incursions in northeastern India.
The fact-finding team, dispatched by the People’s Party of Arunachal Pradesh (PPA), a constituent of the North East Democratic Alliance (a Bharatiya Janata Party-led regional bloc), embarked on its mission following initial reports of encroachment. Arunachal Pradesh itself is governed by the BJP. Kaling Jerang, Vice President of the PPA, stated that the four-member team’s investigation revealed that Indian armed forces are unable to conduct patrols in the Taksing area of the state from April to October. This inability is attributed to severe weather conditions, including devastating flash floods, pre-monsoon and monsoon downpours, and subsequent landslides. Conversely, the report highlighted that Chinese forces “continue to remain active throughout” this period in the border region. This raises serious questions regarding the adequacy of existing infrastructure on the Indian side to enable the military to effectively defend against potential aggression.
Jerang’s report further alleged that local residents informed the team that Indian forces had abandoned Shera 5, a border patrolling point, after a confrontation with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2023. Jerang also conveyed the deep frustration among locals over the loss of ancestral hunting grounds, asserting, “The ground reports of these intrusions are irrefutable.” He emphasized that “These encroachments are not new or sudden, but expanded over the years gradually,” and criticized the BJP governments in both New Delhi and the state for “turn[ing] their back on the people at the border.” Compounding these concerns, the Nah Welfare Society (NWS), a local tribal body, had previously written to government officials last month, stating that Chinese encroachment has “increased manifold with an intention to occupy as much land as possible.”
In response to these allegations, the Indian army has categorically stated that media reports concerning the alleged encroachment by Chinese forces “are incorrect and without any basis.” However, the Indian Foreign Ministry has adopted a less definitive stance. Randhir Jaiswal, the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, informed reporters that New Delhi has “always emphasised in discussions with the Chinese side that we consider [border] issues as most serious and that the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in these areas is of the utmost importance.” He further articulated that “We have also stated that the state of border affairs will reflect on the state of our larger bilateral ties.” Beijing, much like New Delhi, has responded cautiously, neither explicitly confirming nor denying the renewed border tensions. Guo Jiakun, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, affirmed that “The China-India border situation is generally stable at the moment,” and noted that both countries had recently concluded their 36th meeting on China-India Border Affairs. Guo added that “The two sides agreed to maintain communication via diplomatic and military channels and jointly uphold peace and tranquility in the border areas.”
The border dispute remains a core element of the broader differences between India and China. Its origins can be traced back to the historical role played by the British. In 1914, British India and Tibet, which was not then under Chinese control, signed what is known as the Simla Convention. This agreement demarcated their border as the McMahon Line, named after Henry McMahon, who was the foreign secretary of British India and the primary negotiator of the pact. Following its independence in 1947, India has consistently recognized the McMahon Line as its border with China. However, China, which came under communist rule in 1949, rejects this line as the legitimate boundary with India, arguing that it was not a participant in the Simla Convention negotiations. Beijing asserts sovereignty over the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, referring to it as “South Tibet” or “Zangnan.” Additionally, China controls Aksai Chin, a segment of the disputed Kashmir region that both India and Pakistan claim in its entirety.
In 1962, India and China mutually agreed to treat the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as their de facto boundary while they continued negotiations to resolve their larger border disagreements. The LAC was intended to acknowledge the actual areas under each country’s control. Nevertheless, as BR Deepak, a professor of Chinese studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in Delhi, points out, they have been unable to even agree on the precise alignment of the LAC. The differing claims regarding the LAC’s position in several areas have led to instances where patrols from both sides enter territories claimed by the other. Along the western sector of the LAC in mountainous Ladakh, New Delhi and Beijing have experienced frequent face-offs and tensions in recent years. A particularly severe incident occurred in June 2020, when Indian and Chinese troops engaged in hand-to-hand combat, resulting in the deaths of at least 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. Tensions also persist in the eastern sector of the border, which includes the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. In Sikkim’s Naku La, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in May 2020 and again in January 2021. In the middle sector of the LAC, China and India have smaller disputes in Uttarakhand’s Barahoti and Himachal Pradesh’s Shipki La regions. Furthermore, in 2017, a 73-day tense military standoff occurred in Doklam, a plateau at the trijunction of China, India, and Bhutan, after Beijing deployed heavy road-building equipment to extend a military road southward.
Deepak of JNU warns that “These issues snowballing is always a possibility. A small untoward incident can lead up to massive escalation, as it has happened earlier at times, for example in Galwan,” referencing the deadly clash in Ladakh in June 2020. Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, observes that despite Trump’s tariffs prompting India and China to attempt to revive their bilateral ties, they are still engaged in a “cautious re-engagement” following years of border tensions. Donthi suggests that “China uses the border dispute as a pressure point and to send mixed signals, as it has in the past, leaving India guessing whether local commanders are acting on their own or under direction from the [military] leadership.”
Despite the persistent border tensions, bilateral trade between India and China has experienced significant growth over the past decade. According to the Indian Embassy in Beijing, the bilateral goods trade reached $151.1bn in the 2025-26 financial year, more than doubling the $71.45bn recorded in 2016-17. This surge is predominantly driven by Indian imports from China, which escalated from $61.28bn in 2016-17 to $131.63bn in 2025-26, while Indian exports only increased from $10.17bn to $19.47bn during the same period. Intriguingly, the Trump administration in Washington recently identified India as a tier-1 country allegedly participating in a “shadow transhipment network” designed to help China circumvent American sanctions and tariffs.
Saheli Chattaraj, an assistant professor at Somaiya Vidyavihar University in Mumbai specializing in relations with China, highlights that this juxtaposition of improved economic and diplomatic engagement amidst unresolved border disputes is a defining characteristic of the bilateral relationship. “Economic and diplomatic engagement can improve without resolving the underlying strategic dispute. The border is not simply a bilateral irritant,” she told Al Jazeera. She characterizes India-China relations as “best characterised as managed competition rather than genuine normalisation.” Chattaraj further notes, “China’s behaviour can be understood as an attempt to preserve an asymmetry of power along the disputed frontier and to remind India that improved bilateral relations do not alter the underlying strategic balance.” Donthi concurs, stating that in the larger geopolitical context, “India and China are destined to be competitors.” He concludes that “The unresolved boundary dispute will continue to haunt relations until it is settled.”
